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Abstract 
 
Several philosophical problems arising from the physics of consciousness, 
including identity, duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location, and the 
Boltzmann Brain problem, hinge on one of the most deeply held but unnecessary 
convictions of physicalism: the assumption that brain states and their 
corresponding conscious states can in principle be copied.  In this paper I will 
argue against this assumption by attempting to prove the Unique History 
Theorem, which states, essentially, that conscious correlations to underlying 
quantum mechanical measurement events must increase with time and that every 
conscious state uniquely determines its history from an earlier conscious state.  
By assuming only that consciousness arises from an underlying physical state, I 
will argue that the physical evolution from a first physical state giving rise to a 
conscious state to a second physical state giving rise to a later conscious state is 
unique.  Among the consequences of this theorem are that: consciousness is not 
algorithmic and a conscious state cannot be uploaded to or simulated by a digital 
computer; a conscious state cannot be copied by duplicating a brain or any other 
physical state; and a conscious state cannot be repeated or created de novo.  
These conclusions shed light on the physical nature of consciousness by 
rendering moot a variety of seemingly paradoxical philosophy and science 
fiction problems. 
 
Keywords: Physicalism; copiability of conscious states; strong artificial 
intelligence; physics of consciousness; quantum no-cloning 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The nature of consciousness is fertile ground for a multitude of troubling, if not fascinating, 
thought experiments.  There’s the duplication problem: Imagine we can teleport a traveler to 
another planet by creating “a precise duplicate of the traveler, together with all his memories, his 
intentions, his hopes, and his deepest feelings,” but then we decide not to destroy the original copy?  
“Would his ‘awareness’ be in two places at once?”  (Penrose, 1989, p. 27) There’s the simulation 
problem: If conscious awareness can be uploaded onto a computer, then how do we know we 
aren’t simulated minds in simulated universes?  (See, e.g., Bostrom, 2003) In fact, because 
simulated universes are much less expensive, in terms of matter and energy, than actual universes, 
then if consciousness is indeed algorithmic, we are almost certainly one of vast numbers of 
simulated copies!  There’s the problem of self-location: if a psychopath tells you that he has created 
an exact physical copy of you and will torture it unless you pay a hefty ransom, then you should 
pay the ransom unless you are absolutely sure that you aren’t the copy!  (See, e.g., Elga, 2004)  
There’s the problem of the Boltzmann Brain: If consciousness is just the result of atoms in a brain, 
what’s to prevent a set of physically identical atoms, somewhere in the universe, from accidentally 
coming together in just the right way to create your brain?  And what would that feel like? 
Notice that each of these problems is a direct consequence of the copiability or 
repeatability of conscious states.1  If it turns out, for whatever reason, that conscious states cannot 
actually be copied, then these problems disappear.  Of course, we’d also have to have a good 
explanation for why they couldn’t – and that’s exactly what this paper aims to address. 
Science fiction is full of fascinating plots that involve copying conscious states.  Whether 
each of the above scenarios is actually possible is a scientifically empirical question, and given the 
rate of technology advance, it may be just a matter of time before each is tested.  There are related 
problems that may never be empirically testable, such as, “Will a computer ever become conscious 
– and how would we know?”  There is no consensus on how to measure the existence or level of 
consciousness in an entity.  Some say that consciousness depends on the ability to pass a 
hypothetical “Turing test.”  Some say it depends on the level of complexity in neural networks.  
Some say it depends on certain activity in the brain.  So how can we possibly learn anything about 
the nature of consciousness if it depends on a definition?   
What I want to discover is whether a conscious state is copiable or not.  It’s easy to get 
bogged down in the meaning of “conscious” and lose sight of the fundamental empirical issue.  
It’s as if the question, “Will a ball near Earth experience a force of gravity?” has been preempted 
by, “What do you mean by ‘ball’?”  Fine – let me ask a different question: “If I am near Earth, will 
I experience a force of gravity?”  I am not interested in philosophical or semantic debates about 
the meaning of “conscious” or “identity,” nor do I need to decide on any particular definition of 
consciousness or identity to know that I am conscious and I am me.  My goal in this paper is not 
to engage in idle philosophical chatter or to further dilute the ether with untestable claims.  My 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, I’ll treat copiability and repeatability of conscious states as meaning the same. 
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goal is to derive, if possible, an objectively correct and falsifiable prediction to several questions, 
among them: will it ever be possible to teleport a copy of myself to another planet?  Will it ever 
be possible to upload my conscious awareness onto a computer so that I can outlive my physical 
death?  Will it ever be possible, perhaps in millions of years, for a collection of atoms somewhere 
in the universe to accidentally come together in just the right way to create my conscious 
awareness?  Will it be possible for me to experience these things?2  The answer is yes only if my 
conscious states are fundamentally such that they could be copied or repeated.  Are they? 
Asking these questions does not threaten the scientific assumption of physicalism, which 
holds that consciousness is a purely material phenomenon – i.e., consciousness results from an 
underlying physical state or configuration of matter.  Physicalism does not require the copiability 
of physical or conscious states, which is a separate assumption.  Having said that, copiability seems 
to be a common feature of the physical universe, evidenced by functionally identical mass-
produced consumer products and readily copied computer software and DNA code.  After all, if 
consciousness were to arise from execution of a particular algorithm – the claim of proponents of 
Strong AI – then why wouldn’t it arise from execution of an identical algorithm on a different 
computer?  If consciousness were to arise from a particular configuration of matter – in a robot, 
for example – then why wouldn’t it arise from a functionally identical configuration of matter?  In 
other words, while physicalism does not imply the copiability of conscious states, it might seem 
like it does, even though the above problems of duplication, simulation, identity, etc., arise as a 
direct consequence of this assumption.  In other words, despite the myriad of apparent paradoxes 
that arise, the underlying assumption that conscious states are copiable is rarely questioned within 
the realm of physicalism (but see Aaronson, 2016). 
In this paper I will argue against physicalism’s assumption of the copiability of conscious 
states.  In Section 5, I will attempt to prove the Unique History Theorem – essentially, that every 
conscious state uniquely determines its history from an earlier conscious state – and in Section 6 I 
will discuss its implication that a conscious state cannot be copied or repeated.  To do so, I must 
first discuss concepts like correlation, entanglement, and measurement in Section 2, the basic 
assumptions of the proof in Section 3, and a thought experiment exploring history dependence in 
conscious states in Section 4. 
 
2. Quantum Correlation and Measurement 
 
It is natural, but incorrect, to regard an object as made of individual particles that can each 
be described independently of the object.  Consider, for example, particles A and B, each of which 
can be in state |0> or |1>.  Prior to interaction, the wave states of A and B can be written as a 
superposition of their possible states: 
 
                                                 
2 Those readers who want to debate whether I am conscious or whether these questions have objectively correct 
answers will likely gain little from this article. 
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|𝜓஺⟩  = 𝑎ଵ|0⟩ + 𝑎ଶ|1⟩,     |𝜓஻ ⟩  = 𝑏ଵ|0⟩ + 𝑏ଶ|1⟩, 
 
with coefficient (or “amplitude”) a1 such that the probability of measuring outcome 0 when 
measuring particle A in the basis {0,1} can be calculated as |a1|2, and so forth.  However, when the 
particles interact, their wave states become entangled to produce a single wave state: 
 
|𝜓஺஻⟩  = 𝑧଴଴|0⟩஺|0⟩஻ + 𝑧଴ଵ|0⟩஺|1⟩஻ + 𝑧ଵ଴|1⟩஺|0⟩஻ + 𝑧ଵଵ|1⟩஺|1⟩஻ 
 
That is, interaction between the particles makes it impossible to describe either particle 
independently of the other.  While the example above is trivial, a more interesting example of 
entanglement obtains when, for example, z01 = z10 = 0.  In this case, measurements of the states of 
the particles in the same basis are guaranteed to yield identical outcomes – i.e., perfectly correlated 
outcomes – independently of the separation between the particles.  That is, even if the particles are 
spacelike separated, the measurements of the states of the two particles will give the same outcome, 
an intriguing effect dubbed by Albert Einstein as “spooky action at a distance.”3 
In fact, any interaction between physical systems entangles them to thereby increase their 
correlations.  Consider, for example, the effect of a quantum event on a measurement apparatus 
initially in state |ψ>ready, specifically the measurement in the vertical basis of the spin of an electron 
in a superposition of states |↑> and |↓>.  The following shows the evolution of the system during 
measurement: 
 
|𝜓⟩௥௘௔ௗ௬(𝑐ଵ|↑⟩ + 𝑐ଶ|↓⟩) ⟶ 𝑐ଵห𝜓⟩௨௣ห↑⟩ + 𝑐ଶ|𝜓⟩ௗ௢௪௡|↓⟩, 
 
where |ψ>up is the state of the measuring apparatus that has measured and displayed “spin up,” etc.  
Note that prior to measurement only the electron exists in a superposition state while afterward the 
measuring apparatus, too, exists in a superposition state.  To be fair, the above evolution only 
shows the process of entanglement by which the output of the measuring device gets correlated to 
the corresponding state of the electron.  It does not show “measurement” as is colloquially 
understood – i.e., it does not answer the questions of whether the spin was measured up or down, 
and according to whom?  We were trying to measure the spin of an electron, a weird quantum 
mechanical object whose mathematical description includes simultaneous mutually exclusive 
possibilities.  But instead of measuring an outcome, all we did was create an even bigger weird 
quantum mechanical object: a measuring device whose mathematical description includes 
simultaneous mutually exclusive possibilities. 
                                                 
3 While the results will indeed be perfectly correlated, each measurement outcome will appear random to its local 
observer, thus preventing superluminal signaling via entanglement.  Perfect correlation will only become apparent 
after the observers have had a chance to compare notes, a process limited by the speed of light.  (See, e.g., Maudlin, 
2011) 
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The obvious solution to this conundrum seems to be to send in an actual person to read the 
output on the measuring device.  However, adding a human observer to the system requires that 
either we accept that the human herself goes into a superposition state of both witnessing an “up” 
measurement and witnessing a “down” measurement (e.g., the Many Worlds Interpretation of 
quantum mechanics), or the state nonlinearly “collapses” into either |ψ>up |↑> or |ψ>down |↓> (e.g., 
the Copenhagen Interpretation).  Collapse interpretations are arguably more palatable to common 
sense, but they necessitate an explanation of how and when a measurement occurs.  For instance, 
does measurement have something to do with the interaction between a “microscopic” system and 
a “macroscopic” system, as in GRW objective reduction?  (See, e.g., Ghirardi et al., 1986)  Does 
it require consciousness?4  Von Neumann (1932) famously showed that a quantum particle being 
measured gets entangled with the measuring device, which gets entangled with the table on which 
the measuring device sits, and so on, in a so-called von Neumann chain, until collapse of the overall 
wave state, and that the collapse may occur at any point along the chain until the subjective 
perception of the human observer.  Nevertheless, because none of these interpretations of quantum 
mechanics is currently empirically distinct, their debate is purely philosophical (and, arguably, 
scientifically irrelevant).  What is relevant, however, is the objective answer to this question: “If I 
measure the electron’s spin with a measuring device, will I observe a definite outcome?”  The 
answer is yes.  No philosophical semantics need obfuscate this conclusion.  By the time I’ve 
observed an outcome, a measurement has taken place.   
Just as important as identifying what does constitute measurement is identifying what does 
not constitute measurement.  For example, consider a double-slit experiment performed on a 
stream of particles aimed at a screen, the measuring device potentially capable of determining 
which slit each particle passes through.  If no “which-path” information is collected, the particles 
hit the screen in a pattern consistent with the notion that they are waves that pass through both slits 
– that is, an interference pattern.  If which-path information is collected, then the particles 
predictably act as bits of matter and the interference pattern disappears, almost as if the particles 
“know” whether or not they are being watched.  However, amazingly, if the which-path 
information is completely and irretrievably erased, the interference pattern reappears, as if the 
particles had acted as waves all along.  (See, e.g., Kim et al., 2000)  Even more oddly, the choice 
of whether or not to erase the which-path information can be made after the particles have already 
hit the screen – and, in principle, even millions of years later.  In a so-called delayed-choice 
quantum eraser experiment, the choice of whether or not to erase which-path information appears 
to retroactively determine whether a particle is detected as having passed through one slit or both.  
(See, e.g., Aspect et al., 1982)  In other words, a decision made long after a double-slit experiment 
is performed can, it seems, retroactively determine whether particles act as waves or bits of matter.5  
                                                 
4 While few physicists seriously entertain the notion that wave state reduction requires consciousness, de Barros and 
Oas (2017) showed that “any experiment trying to falsify [the consciousness-causes-collapse hypothesis] on the 
basis of its different dynamics is doomed.” 
5 It is easy to confuse correlation with causation, particularly in the quantum world.  Quantum eraser experiments 
show that there will be a correlation between a post-measurement decision by an observer and a pre-measurement 
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If we regard the interference pattern as having been created by particles whose path was not 
measured, then the quantum eraser experiments teach us that if all potential correlation information 
of a quantum measurement is completely and irretrievably erased, then the quantum measurement, 
on retrospect, did not occur.  In other words, measurement, as a bare-bones requirement, must 
create a lasting physical correlation. 
 Therefore, this paper will adopt the conservative notion of measurement simply as lasting 
physical correlation, thus mooting the concern of whether and when a wave state collapse occurs.  
Having said that, the best evidence I have that a measurement has taken place is that I make a 
conscious observation that is correlated to the outcome of the measurement. 
 
3.  Conscious and Physical States 
 
I make several assumptions in this analysis.  First, I assume physicalism in the broadest 
sense: that the conscious state C1 of a conscious entity results from, supervenes on, and is a 
function only of some underlying physical state S1 of matter.  Of course, there’s no guarantee that 
a given physical state will create a conscious state – probably very, very few will – but if a 
conscious state exists then it depends entirely on the underlying physical state. 
I also assume that copying physical state S1 elsewhere in spacetime would produce the 
exact same conscious state C1 of the exact same person.  This seems obvious to me because if two 
identical physical states could produce conscious experiences that were distinct in any way 
(including conscious states experienced by different people), then that difference would have to 
reside in something non-physical, thus contradicting physicalism.  Nevertheless, there is some 
debate in the philosophy literature about whether identical physical systems separated by space or 
time are “numerically” identical.  But such esoteric objections are utterly irrelevant to the present 
analysis because the problems introduced in Section 1 conveniently disappear if identical copies 
did not produce identical people.  After all, if copying a physical state S1 elsewhere did not give 
rise to the same conscious state C1 of the same person, then where’s the problem?  If, for example, 
creating an exact replica of my physical state on Mars (coupled with destroying the original me) 
did not have the effect of teleporting me to Mars, then I’ve answered the question at hand and do 
not wish to engage in further debate as to who the person created on Mars might be. 
I also assume that a given conscious state might be created by more than one physical state.  
In other words, it may be the case that conscious state C1 arises from any member of some large 
set S1* of underlying physical states, and that creating any of these physical states will produce 
the same conscious state C1 of the same person.  For instance, if it were ever possible to upload 
my consciousness onto a computer so that I can outlive my physical death, then it must be that my 
                                                 
action by particles.  Strange as this may be, it is not quite correct to say that a decision in the future can cause an 
event in the past, because the effect can only be observed after the decision is made.  Just as one cannot transmit 
information faster than light via quantum entanglement, information cannot be sent into the past by “peeking” at the 
screen before the decision is made in a delayed-choice quantum eraser experiment to see which decision will be 
made. 
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actual physical state would produce the same conscious state of the same person (me) as the very 
different physical state of a computer executing a software version of me.  If a conscious state 
could not be copied to create the same person, then I can give up hope of immortality via computer 
simulation and won’t further debate who the person created on the computer might be. 
Why talk of conscious states at all?  Because I know I’m in one.  I don’t claim to know 
what consciousness is, but I do claim to be conscious.  Further, physicalism assumes that a given 
conscious state arises from an underlying physical state, but what is that?  Classically, we might 
think of the physical state of a system in terms of the three-dimensional positions and momenta, 
at a given time, of all of its constituent particles.  Such a system is, in principle, perfectly 
deterministic as well as time-reversible. 
However, the classical viewpoint is inconsistent with quantum mechanics.  For instance, it 
can’t be said that any given particle in a system even has a position or momentum until measured.  
Worse, while its position can be measured to nearly arbitrary precision, quantum uncertainty 
guarantees a trade-off in the precision to which we can simultaneously measure its momentum.  
For that reason scientists often imagine a particle as a Gaussian “wave packet” whose spread in 
the position basis is inversely related to its spread in the momentum basis.  To further complicate 
the issue and as broached in Section 2, the mathematical description of a particle can’t be separated 
from that of other particles with which it is correlated.  Therefore one current understanding of the 
physical state of an isolated system is an infinite-dimensional wave state consisting of a 
superposition of mutually exclusive “pure” states, each pure state described by a complex 
amplitude such that the probability of measuring the system in that pure state is the square of the 
absolute value of its amplitude.  In principle, this wave state is deterministic and time-reversible – 
unless and until we admit that we sometimes observe definite outcomes to measurements.  In other 
words, it is neither.  Further, because there is no way, even in principle, to determine the wave 
state’s initial or current conditions, the quantum mechanical description of a physical system larger 
than a few atoms does no better a job at elucidating the concept of “physical state” than the classical 
description. 
So when I assert that my conscious state C1 is created by physical state S1, I don’t 
necessarily know what kinds of information or sorts of physical attributes specify that physical 
state S1.  I also don’t know how big state S1 is.  Is it the local physical state of certain neural 
connections in my brain?  The state of my entire brain?  My body?  The planet?  The universe?   
In other words, I know I am in conscious state C1, and I know that that state results from some 
underlying physical state S1.  But I don’t claim to know much more.   
That said, one thing I can claim about any isolated physical system, based on the analysis 
in Section 2, is that its state reflects quantum measurements.  Because a quantum measurement 
causes a lasting physical correlation, then the physical state of an isolated system must embed its 
history of quantum measurements.  Consider the effect of a quantum measurement “branching” 
event on a system in initial state S1 where measurement “A” would result in a physical state Sa that 
is correlated to outcome A while measurement “B” would result in a physical state Sb that is 
correlated to outcome B.  These two hypothetical physical states (Sa and Sb) would have to evolve 
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along forever distinct branches so as to maintain their respective correlations; they could never 
evolve to the same physical state S2.  If they could, then state S2, and all future physical states, 
would necessarily be uncorrelated to the measurement result, in which case the measurement event 
could not have happened.  In other words, quantum correlations do not decrease; physical state is 
history-dependent.   
Consequently, one cannot, even in principle, produce a copy of some physical state by 
measuring and replicating its physical attributes (position, etc.).  If a physical state inherently 
embeds its unique history of quantum measurements, then there is no shortcut to creating or 
copying a physical state.  Physical state S2 encodes its unique evolution, including all quantum 
measurement outcomes, from earlier physical state S1.  The only way to create physical state S2 is 
to produce a system of particles that has the correct correlation relationship among its particles, 
and the only way to do that is to start with physical state S1 and to keep one’s fingers crossed that 
it accidentally – via a unique series of random quantum measurement outcomes – evolves to state 
S2.  And of course the only way to create physical state S1 is to create an earlier state S0 that 
happens to evolve in just the right way... and so on back.  In other words, every physical state is 
uniquely defined by its history and, quite simply, cannot be created de novo. 
Therefore, my assumptions regarding physical and conscious states are minimal: 
specifically, that I am in a conscious state and that that conscious state results from an underlying 
physical state that uniquely determines its history. 
I’ll also assume that the only source of indeterminism in the universe is quantum 
measurement.  In other words, I’ll assume that a given physical state evolves deterministically and 
predictably, punctuated only by branching events caused by quantum measurement.  Whether free 
will exists and the extent to which its existence affects the present arguments will be saved for a 
future analysis.  Setting aside the question of free will, it may strike some as odd to treat any 
conscious experience as depending on a quantum measurement.  How do I know that conscious 
experience can’t be described adequately with classical modeling?  How do I know that 
consciousness could even be sensitive to quantum events?  The answer is simple: I am only 
interested in nondeterministic branching events, and the only known physical means is through 
quantum measurement.  Such events need not happen within the brain, and in fact I have made no 
assumptions at all about the function of the brain or its relationship to consciousness.  It is also 
indisputable that quantum events are regularly amplified in the real world so as to cause conscious 
correlation: consider the simple example of a person measuring (and consciously correlating to) a 
radioactive decay by hearing a “click” from a Geiger counter.  So, absent free will, any and all 
conscious branching must ultimately be caused by quantum measurement. 
Finally, I use the colloquial expression “stream of consciousness” for clarity only without 
assuming anything about the extent to which conscious experiences are continuous or discrete; and 
I use the word “person” to refer to any conscious entity, whether that entity is a human possessing 
“wetware,” a conscious artificial intelligence running software, or any other conscious creature. 
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4. How to Win the Lottery 
 
A person in conscious state C1 has just purchased a lottery ticket with numbers 31-41-59-
26-53-58.  At time t1, he sits down to watch the live lottery results on television, the six numbers 
drawn one at a time until future time t2.  Given that any nondeterminism in the lottery ball selection 
is due to quantum fluctuations, he knows that there are potentially billions of possible future 
conscious states in which he might exist at time t2.  However, the state that interests him most is 
one particular conscious state, which we will call C2, in which he is holding the winning lottery 
ticket.  Given that the imagined events naturally leading to state C2 are possible but very unlikely, 
the gambler wants to guarantee the desired outcome by directly creating state C2.  Now let’s 
assume – and this is the key assumption – that it is possible to independently create conscious state 
C2 at time t1.  It should not matter whether the person’s physical matter is instantaneously 
reconfigured to produce conscious state C2 or a different collection of matter is configured into an 
identical conscious state C2, so for the sake of clarity, let us assume that the person opts for the 
latter solution.  In other words, while the person exists at time t1 in conscious state C1 from physical 
matter M1, conscious state C2 is created at time t1 from physical matter M2.  Because conscious 
state C2 is now definitely a future state of conscious state C1, the person in state C1 can expect his 
conscious state to eventually become C2.6 
Note that the person does not care which stream of consciousness he actually experiences 
from time t1 to t2.  He does not care if he actually observes the drawing of numbers 20-20-20-20-
20-20 or even if, after the drawing of the third number, lightning strikes his television.  All he cares 
about is that at time t2, he witnesses on his television screen the winning lottery numbers of 31-41-
59-26-53-58.  So the question now is whether conscious state C2 can only be reached by a single, 
unique stream of consciousness or whether there are others.  In Fig. 1, three possible future 
conscious states C2, C2’, and C2’’ are shown (among countless others), with the shown paths 
indicating, conceptually, possible streams of consciousness from conscious state C1.  First stream 
of consciousness SOCa is the person’s experience of watching, one by one, the selection of 
numbers 31, then 41, then 59, then 26, then 53, and finally 58, while second stream of 
consciousness SOCb is the person’s experience of something else; in both cases, however, it is 
posited that the person ends up in conscious state C2. 
We need no explanation for SOCa, which seems to be the more natural path to conscious 
state C2.  At state C2, having experienced path SOCa, the person has exactly the experience and 
memories one would expect from having experienced path SOCa – i.e., from time t1 to t2, he 
experiences the drawing of each of the numbers on his lottery ticket and in state C2 he experiences 
                                                 
6 I will ignore the objection by proponents of the Many Worlds Interpretation that conscious state C2 of matter M2 
might be a different “person” than the person of conscious state C1 of matter M1, or the philosophical objection that 
identity wouldn’t necessarily flow from state C1 to C2, and so forth.  The present thought experiment hinges on the 
assumption that it is possible for the person to directly create the conscious state in which he has won the lottery, not 
some hypothetical doppelganger in a one-in-a-billion branch.  If conscious state C2 is not a future state of him, then 
why go to the trouble of creating state C2?   
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having won the lottery.  On the other hand, SOCb would seem to require some kind of memory 
modification at time t2: from t1 to t2 he has an experience inconsistent with the moment leading up 
to winning the lottery, but then at C2 he experiences having won the lottery.  I will now argue that 
SOCb (and any stream of consciousness besides SOCa) is not possible, that a future conscious state 
is determined by a unique stream of consciousness. 
 
 
     C2’ 
  
      SOCa 
 
C1          C2 
      SOCb 
 
     C2’’ 
   
Fig. 1.  Different streams of consciousness evolving to the same conscious state. 
 
 
We have assumed that conscious state C2 can be created de novo from matter M2.  Because 
state C2 has literally just been created at time t1, state C2 is path-independent and has no history.  
In other words, even though state C2 may include a consistent memory as if he did experience 
either SOCa or SOCb, it makes no sense to speak of state C2, having been newly created from 
matter M2, as having actually experienced SOCa or SOCb.  However, conscious state C1 (made of 
matter M1) must evolve to state C2: if the person embodied by matter M1 wasn’t guaranteed to 
eventually experience conscious state C2, then it contradicts the original assumption that it is 
possible to create conscious state C2 at time t1.  So the person embodied by matter M1 does 
experience a stream of consciousness from time t1 to t2 – likely the natural stream SOCa instead of 
SOCb, although it doesn’t actually matter for the sake of argument.  Thus the person in conscious 
state C2 made of matter M1 has, in fact, experienced a particular stream of consciousness, while 
the person in conscious state C2 made of matter M2 has not.  But they are the same person!  
Conscious state C2 must be the same whether state C2 is created de novo or whether it evolves via 
SOCa or SOCb, so the person in state C2 (whether of matter M1 or M2) must have, in fact, 
experienced a particular stream of consciousness, which means that state C2 can’t be path-
independent after all.  Therefore, the only way to “create” a person in conscious state C2 is to start 
with a person in conscious state C1 and wait while he experiences the unique path (SOCa) required 
to create state C2.  Said another way, if the person experiences state C2, then he can be sure he’s 
experienced the only stream of consciousness that led there from state C1: SOCa. 
One objection to the above argument is that matter matters: it is not necessarily the case 
that a conscious state emerging from a configuration of matter M1 is the same person as an identical 
conscious state emerging from a configuration of matter M2.  For instance, perhaps at time t1 the 
person had his matter “rearranged” to produce conscious state C2 so that he does not actually 
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experience a stream of consciousness, unique or not, from state C1 to C2.  Or perhaps at time t2, 
when he is in some alternate conscious state C2’ in which he believes he did not win the lottery, 
his matter is rearranged to effect a memory modification to state C2, in which he believes he did 
win the lottery.  These are merely quibbles.  In fact the thought experiment was fatal from the 
outset because it assumed that a conscious state C2, which depends on unpredictable quantum 
events that occur after time t1, could be created at time t1.  The next section will more rigorously 
analyze why every conscious state uniquely determines its history, a conclusion that will be 
formalized in the Unique History Theorem. 
 
5. Proof of the Unique History Theorem 
 
Imagine some initial conscious state C1 that is about to correlate to a quantum measurement 
event having possible outcome A or B.  In other words, a quantum branching event is about to 
occur and the person’s stream of consciousness will take either path SOCa that includes a conscious 
state Ca, correlated to measurement outcome A, or path SOCb that includes a conscious state Cb, 
correlated to measurement outcome B.  My question is whether it is possible for streams SOCa and 
SOCb to evolve to the same conscious state C2.  If not, then conscious states, like their underlying 
physical states, are history-dependent.  To answer this question, let’s consider two scanarios: 
Scenario #1: A person in some initial conscious state is about to do a quantum spin 
measurement on an electron, whose outcomes are A (“up”) and B (“down”).  The measurement 
apparatus is designed so that if the measurement outcome is A, then a large “A” flashes briefly on 
a screen; for B, a large “B” flashes.  In the case of measurement A, the person experiences stream 
of consciousness SOCa that includes a conscious state Ca in which she consciously observes seeing 
the letter “A” flash on the screen – i.e., state Ca is correlated to measurement A.  To be fair, in 
neither case has she actually observed the spin of an electron, which is far too small for human 
observation.  What has really transpired is an amplification of a quantum measurement: 
consecutive correlated events amplified the initial measurement so that trillions of photons strike 
the screen in the shape of “A” or “B,” the observed image correlated to the initial measurement.  
Still, even if the person hasn’t directly observed the spin of the electron, she at least understands 
that her conscious state Ca, for example, is correlated to an “up” spin measurement outcome and 
is, in some sense, an observation of that outcome.  However, correlation of a conscious state to a 
quantum measurement outcome need not be so blatantly related to observation of that outcome, as 
demonstrated by...   
Scenario #2: Unbeknownst to some taxpayer, a random (quantum) error occurs in a 
computer used by the Internal Revenue Service such that if the error is measured as A, he will be 
mailed a refund check for $1000, but if it is measured as B, he will be mailed a letter demanding 
$1000.  After receiving a sealed envelope from the IRS the following week, he will experience 
one of two competing streams of consciousness SOCa or SOCb, each correlated to one of the 
possible measurement outcomes, even if he has no idea that the stream of consciousness he does 
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experience is the result of some quantum measurement event, much less some measurement event 
in a remote IRS computer that occurred a week before. 
Before further analyzing these scenarios, I should point out that a conscious correlation to 
a quantum measurement outcome might (at least at first) be barely detectable; perhaps it results in 
a slightly different aroma, a nuance of feeling, a mild change in taste.  All that is required in this 
thought experiment is that the distinction is consciously detectable – i.e., that conscious state Ca, 
correlated to measurement A, is consciously distinct from state Cb, correlated to measurement B.  
So we might say that conscious state Ca is correlated to measurement A if some aspect of conscious 
state Ca is evidence that outcome A was measured, or perhaps that conscious state Ca could not 
have been experienced unless outcome A was measured. 
The question in both of the above scenarios is: could SOCa and SOCb evolve to the same 
conscious state C2?  Note that in order for both SOCa and SOCb to evolve to the same conscious 
state C2, state C2 must itself be uncorrelated to the quantum measurement event.  So, in Scenario 
#1, for state C2 to be uncorrelated to the measurement outcome, the experience of state C2 cannot 
provide evidence that either “A” or “B” flashed on the screen.  Consider the case in which 
conscious state Ca is in fact experienced just before C2; what would that feel like?  What would it 
be like to consciously observe the letter “A” flash on a screen and then to experience a subsequent 
conscious state that is entirely uncorrelated to the quantum measurement event whose 
amplification resulted in that preceding conscious observation?  Maybe it is like the experience of 
seeing the letter “A” flash on a screen and then instantly forgetting it. 
However, Scenario #2 poses a greater conundrum.  Imagine that state Ca is the experience 
of first seeing a check made out to him for $1000 while Cb is the experience of first seeing a 
demand for $1000 on IRS letterhead.  For some future state C2 to be uncorrelated to the 
measurement outcome, the experience of state C2 cannot provide evidence of either the windfall 
(correlated to measurement A) or the debt (correlated to measurement B).  The question is not 
whether there is some future conscious state C2 in which he is not thinking about the outcome or 
has forgotten about the outcome; indeed we would expect that very few of his future conscious 
states would actively reflect on that windfall (or debt), and that there might even be a point in his 
future in which he has wholly forgotten about it.  The question is whether it is possible for some 
future state C2 to be entirely uncorrelated to the outcome.  It is much harder to imagine such a 
state. 
We can conceive of a series of consecutive conscious experiences starting at Ca – for 
instance, he excitedly calls his mother, then jumps in his car to drive to the bank, then gets into a 
car accident that sends him to the hospital... and so forth.  And we can conceive of a serious of 
consecutive conscious experiences starting at Cb – for instance, he angrily kicks a hole in the wall, 
behind which he finds an antique container, inside which he discovers $1 million in gold bullion... 
and so forth.  The question is whether it is conceivable that these two independent streams of 
consciousness could ever converge to the same conscious state, totally uncorrelated to the original 
measurement outcome?  The answer seems intuitively “no” because states Ca and Cb were chosen 
to be so extreme and clearly distinct that it is hard to imagine any future stream of consciousness 
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that is not affected, in some way, by the experience of either Ca or Cb.  Every possible future 
conscious state seems to hinge on (and therefore embed the history of) the original outcome of A 
or B.  Each possible stream SOCa and SOCb seems to consist of a series of conscious experiences, 
each experience correlated to its preceding experience, on backward in time to the original 
quantum measurement outcome of A or B.  In other words, in each stream, conscious correlations 
grow such that every conscious experience he has afterward can be traced back to that original 
quantum glitch in the IRS’s computer.   
Based solely on the extreme example of Scenario #2, one might conclude that each possible 
stream of consciousness from a quantum branching event evolves chaotically and with ever 
increasing conscious correlations.7  But is this generally true?  What about when the conscious 
states Ca and Cb are not especially distinct, as in Scenario #1?  For that observer, the differences 
between states Ca and Cb may be minimal.  For example: she hasn’t eaten all day and she’s hungry; 
the temperature in the lab is too low and she’s shivering; she’s bored from doing so many spin 
measurements.  Conscious states Ca and Cb may be identical in many respects, differing only in 
her observation of the letter that flashes on the screen.  It is much easier to imagine the two similar 
(but distinct) conscious states of Scenario #1 evolving to an identical conscious state than the two 
extremely different conscious states of Scenario #2.  Easy to imagine or not, is it actually possible 
for any two distinct conscious states to evolve to the same conscious state?   
More generally, is it possible for a conscious state that is correlated to a quantum 
measurement outcome to evolve to a conscious state that is not correlated to that outcome – i.e., 
is it possible for a conscious state to not uniquely determine its history?  To answer this question, 
I must consider the differences between physical and conscious states.  As previously discussed, 
it is not possible for a physical state correlated to a quantum measurement outcome to evolve to a 
physical state uncorrelated to that same outcome, but conscious states are different in that there is 
no guarantee that conscious states always correlate to their underlying physical states.  For 
instance, the physical state of a measuring device may correlate to the outcome of a quantum 
measurement event, but if an observer is not paying attention, his conscious state may not 
immediately correlate to the outcome.   
Referring to Fig. 2, consider a tree of possible future physical states of state S, which 
creates a person’s conscious state C.  At some point, a quantum measurement event occurs so that 
S evolves either to Sa (correlated to measurement A) or Sb (correlated to measurement B).  For 
whatever reason, this branch does not result in a correlated conscious state, so both Sa and Sb still 
map to conscious state C.  This example assumes that conscious observation is not required to 
effect measurement, given that the corresponding conscious state does not change from S to Sa (or 
                                                 
7 The 1998 film Sliding Doors popularized one version of this thought experiment.  Imagine a person running 
toward the open doors of a subway car.  A branching event occurs so that one possible physical state Sa is such that 
the person is a little closer to the subway doors than that of another physical state Sb; conscious state Ca of the 
person, created by underlying physical state Sa, may be nearly identical to conscious state Cb created by state Sb, the 
main difference being in her observation of her distance from the subway doors.  The subsequent closing of these 
subway doors serves as an amplification event whereby all of the protagonist’s future conscious states can ultimately 
be traced back to the original branching event. 
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Sb).  It is assumed that measurement A causes (or is at least correlated to) a subsequent quantum 
measurement event whose outcome is either C or D.  There is no reason to assume that 
measurement B causes the same subsequent quantum measurement event as measurement A, so it 
is assumed that the quantum event following outcome B will have either outcome E or F, different 
from C or D; and so forth.   
Fig. 2 is a highly simplified version of reality, intended to show only the possible 
relationships between physical states and their resulting conscious states.  For example, 
deterministic time dependence is omitted: physical state S (and the conscious state C it creates) 
might evolve deterministically with time, but all I care about for the sake of this analysis are 
quantum branching events.  Two additional comments about Fig. 2: first, while states Sac and Sbe, 
for example, are shown in the same column, they need not occur at the same time; second, only 
binary branchings are shown for simplicity. 
 
 
      Sacg(Cacg)  
    Sac(C)  Sach(C)  Sadiq(Cadiq, Cadi, Cad, Ca, or C) 
  Sa(C)    Sadi(Cadi) Sadir(Cadir, Cadi, Cad, Ca, or C) 
    Sad(C)  Sadj(Cadj) Sadjs(Cadjs, Cadj, Cad, Ca, or C) 
S(C)      Sbek(C)  Sadjt(Cadjt, Cadj, Cad, Ca, or C) 
    Sbe(C)  Sbel(C)  
  Sb(C)    Sbfm(Cbfm)  
    Sbf(C)  Sbfn(C)  
 
Fig. 2. Tree of possible future physical and conscious states of physical state S. 
 
 
Note that because each measurement outcome makes possible the next measurement, each 
measurement outcome is also correlated with its every prior measurement outcome; this is the 
visual analog of the statement in Section 3 that every physical state uniquely determines its 
history.8  For instance, assume that outcome G has been measured.  Because the branching to G 
was made possible by outcome C, and the branching to C was made possible by outcome A, then 
outcome G correlates to outcomes C and A, as indicated below by Sacg.  A similar nomenclature is 
used for conscious states.  For instance, while physical state Sad is shown to produce the same 
conscious state C as both S and Sa – in other words, outcomes A and D do not result in a correlated 
conscious state – the subsequent measurement outcome (either I or J) is correlated to a conscious 
state.  (This could be explained simply as the person consciously noticing the measurement result.)  
But once a conscious state is correlated with an outcome (J, for instance), it is inherently correlated 
                                                 
8 It might have seemed strange in Section 2 that quantum mechanics requires a measurement to create a “lasting” 
physical correlation.  What does that mean?  How long must we wait?  Because measurement outcomes are 
correlated to past measurement outcomes, the conscious correlation of one measurement outcome ensures a lasting 
physical correlation of that outcome as well as every correlated outcome leading up to it. 
15 
 
to every prior outcome – in this case A and D – for the same reason that underlying physical state 
Sadj is so correlated.  The person in conscious state Cadj need not be consciously aware that A or D 
or even J have been measured; rather, state Cadj is distinct from other possible conscious states in 
a way that depends on a measurement of outcome J (which depends on D, which depends on A, 
etc.). 
Having explained the layout of the tree in Fig. 2, my goal is to discover if, and under what 
circumstances, a conscious state does not uniquely determine its history.  I will attempt to find an 
example of a conscious state that can reach a possible future conscious state via two mutually 
exclusive conscious states. 
Consider the conscious state (C) that arises from underlying state Sad.  What are the possible 
conscious states arising from Sadir and Sadjs, for example, so that conscious state C (arising from 
Sad) can reach a future conscious state (arising from either Sadir or Sadjs) via either Cadi (arising from 
Sadi) or Cadj (arising from Sadj)?  In Fig. 2, the possible conscious states of Sadir and Sadjs are shown 
– for instance, state Sadir could produce any of conscious states Cadir, Cadi, Cad, Ca, or C (or any prior 
conscious state).  However, to ensure that both Cadi and Cadj could evolve to the same conscious 
state, then Sadir and Sadjs cannot produce a conscious state that is correlated to any event after 
measurement outcome D – that is, they must produce a conscious state of Cad or “less.” 
Let’s analyze this particular example and add another column in Fig. 3.  If this example 
was possible, it would demonstrate a counterexample to the assertion that every conscious state 
uniquely determines its history because the person’s conscious correlations would decrease from 
state Cadi (or Cadj).  Notice in Fig. 3 that future conscious states of Cad are correlated to either 
outcome I or J, so the exception to the rule – the conscious state causing the logical problem – is 
Cad. 
 
 
    Sadiq  Sadirw(Cadirw) 
  Sadi(Cadi) Sadir(Cad) Sadirx(Cadirx) 
Sad(C) 
  Sadj(Cadj) Sadjs(Cad) Sadjsy(Cadjsy) 
    Sadjt  Sadjsz(Cadjsz) 
 
Fig. 3. Tree showing conscious state C evolving to conscious state Cad via different streams 
of consciousness. 
 
 
Indeed it can easily be deduced that if it is possible that C1C2 does not define a unique 
stream of consciousness, where C2 is correlated to some recent measurement outcome M, then 
those non-unique streams of consciousness must include conscious states correlated to a 
measurement outcome after M.  How could this be possible?  And what would it feel like?  In Fig. 
3, what is the subjective experience of a person as his underlying physical state evolves from Sad 
to, say, Sadirx?  Ostensibly, the stream appears as CCadiCadCadirx, but what does he actually 
experience? 
16 
 
One possibility is to accept the stream on its face: the person starts in state C, then 
experiences state Cadi (perhaps by observing outcome I), then immediately forgets outcome I and 
experiences state Cad that is completely unrelated to outcome I, then experiences state Cadirx, which 
is correlated to outcome I (as well as R and X).  I cannot imagine such an experience; perhaps such 
a subjective experience isn’t possible.   
Another possibility is that the person subjectively experiences a stream of consciousness 
that skips over the immediately forgotten state, i.e., CCadCadirx.  But if that’s true, then Fig. 3 
no longer represents a problem because conscious state Cad does then uniquely determine its 
history.  Still another possibility is that the person subjectively experiences conscious states in 
order of increasing correlations, i.e., CCadCadiCadirx.  But again, if true, then Fig. 3 no longer 
represents a problem because conscious state Cad does uniquely determine its history. 
It certainly seems that the example shown in Fig. 3 is either not possible or else is 
subjectively perceived in a way that conscious correlations do not decrease.  Still, to understand 
what makes the example in Fig. 3 so strange, let me introduce the concept of lag.  Lag represents 
the number of measurement outcomes to which an underlying physical state is correlated but the 
emergent conscious state is not correlated.  Roughly, lag represents the number of times a physical 
state changes before a change is reflected in the emergent conscious state.  Naturally, lag can 
increase by at most one in each step: either a physical state change gets reflected in a conscious 
state change or it doesn’t.  Consider, in Fig. 3, the path leading to state Sadirx: 
 
S produces C    lag 0 
Sa produces C   lag 1 
Sad produces C  lag 2 
Sadi produces Cadi  lag 0 
Sadir produces Cad  lag 2 
Sadirx produces Cadirx  lag 0 
 
The apparent inconsistency inherent in state Cad is made explicit above: the increase in lag 
from 0 to 2 in a single physical step, producing state Cad after state Cadi, thus a reduction in 
conscious correlation.  While any counterexample to the assertion that conscious states are history-
dependent can be shown to increase lag unnaturally, I have not shown that an unnatural lag increase 
(i.e., reduction in conscious correlation) violates physics.9  Nevertheless, even if an unnatural lag 
is physically possible, how problematic would it be?  It depends on the lengths of lags – how long 
do they last?  Conscious awareness seems to update very fast; for example, refresh rates in video 
footage of significantly less than 20 frames per second are consciously perceptible.  Therefore it 
                                                 
9 Then again, if physical state determines conscious state, then it determines lag, and we might properly ask why the 
universe would care when we observe something, given we have already assumed that consciousness is irrelevant to 
measurement.  A reduction in conscious correlation probably does violate physics. 
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seems that typical lags of the kind that might concern us must be significantly less than a second.10  
Is this a threat to the assertion that conscious states are history-dependent and that conscious 
correlations do not decrease?  Not if we care about a conscious state C2 that is downstream from a 
past conscious state C1 by days, weeks, or years – or anything significantly more than a second.  
In other words, to the extent that conscious correlations could ever decrease, such an oddity would 
affect the present analysis only to within a very short time period of state C2. 
Having said that, there are other reasons to think that the evolutions shown in Fig. 3 are not 
physically possible.  Consider that when Cad is experienced, it is assumed to be history-independent 
– that is, that there is no fact of the matter about whether the person previously experienced Cadi 
or Cadj.  But that’s problematic because Cad is in fact created by one of two possible physical states 
(Sadir and Sadjs), only one of which will evolve to a physical state that creates a conscious state 
correlated to, for instance, event J.  In other words, there is no such state as Cad – rather, there is 
“a state Cad whose next conscious state will be correlated to event I” and “a state Cad whose next 
conscious state will be correlated to event J.”  So even though we have assumed the existence of a 
Cad that is history-independent, the only way for a person to experience Cad is to first experience 
either Cadi or Cadj, a history that will be reflected in future conscious states of Cad.  This reasoning 
seems to imply that no such history-independent Cad could exist and, consequently, that every 
conscious state inevitably evidences its preceding conscious states. 
Therefore, in deciding whether a conscious state uniquely determines its history from an 
earlier conscious state: for a very brief history, such as a second or two, the answer might be no; 
for a history of any significant length, the answer is yes.  Therefore: 
 
Unique History Theorem: For any time period in which lag is insignificant, a unique 
stream of consciousness maps a conscious state C1 to a possible future state C2; every 
conscious state uniquely determines its history from an earlier conscious state. 
 
6. Implications of the Unique History Theorem 
 
If my analysis has been correct, then the conscious state of a person is defined by her history 
of experiences; and her conscious state C2 is determined relative to her earlier conscious state C1 
by the unique stream of consciousness that she experienced.  There are many implications of this 
assertion. 
First, a conscious state can’t be repeated.  Imagine, for example, the repeat of conscious 
state C2 via C1C2C3C2.  This violates the Unique History Theorem because C2 does not 
define a unique history from C1.  Second, a conscious state can’t be created de novo, nor can one 
                                                 
10 Scenario #2, for example, involved a hypothetical lag of a week, but by the time his conscious state correlated to 
the quantum outcome, the possibility of a future conscious state that did not correlate to that outcome seemed not 
credible.  The real worry in Fig. 3 arises when lag is low, as in Scenario #1 and the example in Section 4. 
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be copied by creating an identical conscious state out of different matter, because such a state 
would be independent of history.11   
Consequently, all the science fiction problems broached in Section 1 conveniently 
disappear.  For instance, if teleportation will ever be possible, it can’t be by copying a conscious 
state or its underlying physical state.12  Perhaps more surprisingly, consciousness can’t be 
simulated or uploaded to a digital computer; if it could, then nothing would prevent repeating a 
conscious state.  Also, software is inherently history-independent: the same software could be 
produced by a human programmer as by a group of chimpanzees randomly pecking at a typewriter.  
So if conscious states are history-dependent, they can’t be created by executing software.  Further, 
any algorithm can be executed, in principle, by any general purpose digital computer and can 
therefore be repeated; this implies that consciousness can’t be algorithmic.  This in turn implies 
that a digital computer cannot be conscious and that the underlying premise of Strong AI is false. 
What about the implications regarding the relationship between brain and consciousness?  
It is generally assumed that the brain creates consciousness.  However, the Unique History 
Theorem implies that a Boltzmann Brain isn’t possible – and a Boltzmann Brain is, by its nature, 
the very embodiment of the assertion that “brain causes consciousness.”  So if there is no way to 
copy my conscious state by creating another brain that is physically identical to mine to any 
physically possible degree of precision, then I’m not sure what it means to say, “My brain creates 
my consciousness.”     
Even if an external observer cannot distinguish the physical state of one brain from that of 
another, whatever conscious states arise from these physical states (if any) are history-dependent 
and will be able, from the subjective “inside,” to distinguish themselves.13  For instance, if my 
current conscious state arises from an underlying physical state, both the physical and conscious 
states are history-dependent.  If one were to attempt to copy me by simply duplicating my brain, 
that brain would not have the requisite history, so in the unlikely event that it produced any 
conscious state, that conscious state would not be mine.   
In fact, a person’s conscious state must depend on entanglements among huge quantities 
of matter beyond his brain, a fact ignored in any attempted duplication of his brain.  Consider, for 
example, the stream of consciousness that a carpenter would experience while building a house.  
The person starts, say, at conscious state C1, and the particular stream of consciousness he 
experiences evolves to (and thus yields) a unique conscious state C2.  Assuming low lag – i.e., that 
his conscious state more or less correlates to his underlying physical state in real time – his stream 
of consciousness includes a variety of experiences that correlate to actual events in the world.  For 
instance, he has a conscious visual experience of watching a backhoe level the foundation’s dirt.  
                                                 
11 I exclude the very first conscious state of a person, which of course has no history.  I have no more explanation for 
my first conscious state than I or anyone else does for the first physical state of the universe.  
12 Aaronson suggests quantum no-cloning as the mechanism by which teleportation may be consistent with the non-
copiability of conscious states (2016). 
13 The problem of subjective versus objective evidence of consciousness may be less perplexing after all: the only 
way to measure and specify a person’s conscious state is to obtain information about its entire history, information 
to which only the person is (and can be) privy. 
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If we consider the popular account of consciousness, then this experience can simply be described 
as the capturing of video information via his eyes and the (albeit imperfect) storage of that 
information in his brain.  Conscious experience arises then, per the popular account, from brain 
processes related to the capture, storage, access, and manipulation of this and other sensory 
information.  And while such processes are admittedly not understood, proponents of the popular 
account insist that were we to duplicate the carpenter’s brain, then an identical conscious 
experience would arise due to these brain processes.   
The problem with the popular account is that sensation does not equal experience – i.e., the 
carpenter’s conscious visual experience of watching a backhoe level the foundation’s dirt cannot 
be duplicated by creating and storing video information.  That particular conscious experience was 
correlated to actual events, which means that somewhere in the world (e.g., the construction site), 
there is in fact several tons of dirt that was moved.  The only way to have the carpenter’s particular 
conscious experiences is to actually create the history of correlations specified by the conscious 
state, which is to say that actual dirt must be moved, and the evidence must remain in the form of 
its correlations with other physical systems (like the planet).  The amount of information necessary 
to specify the history of correlations due to this single experience is absolutely massive.  The only 
way to experience conscious state C2 is to be the conscious person who has, in fact, experienced 
the unique stream of consciousness necessary to produce state C2.   
The Unique History Theorem in no way questions the fundamental tenet of physicalism: 
that consciousness results entirely from the physical configuration of matter.  However, it does 
underscore the extent to which popular interpretations of physicalism understate the significance 
and uniqueness of both physical and conscious states.  Besides instantly eliminating many age-old 
problems of identity, duplication, etc., the Unique History Theorem has several other implications 
of which space currently limits elaboration.  For example, because conscious states are history-
dependent, several other science fiction plots are impossible: resetting a conscious state; erasing a 
memory by creating a new conscious state lacking the memory; modifying a memory by creating 
a new conscious state with a fake memory; and so forth. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
I first pointed out that several of the most perplexing problems of science fiction arise from 
an unnecessary assumption of physicalism, specifically that conscious states can be copied or 
repeated.  I then analyzed possible conscious branching events in terms of underlying physical 
states and their correlations to quantum measurement events.  I then attempted to prove the Unique 
History Theorem by showing that a conscious state that is correlated to a quantum measurement 
outcome cannot typically evolve to a conscious state that is not correlated to that outcome.  The 
theorem – which states that, for any time period in which conscious lag is insignificant, every 
conscious state uniquely determines its history from an earlier conscious state – implies that 
conscious states cannot be copied or repeated (including by duplicating a brain) and that 
consciousness cannot be algorithmic. 
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These conclusions are not at odds with physicalism but do conflict with the generally 
accepted (albeit unproven) assumption that consciousness arises from the brain and is copiable in 
principle.  While these conclusions may be viewed skeptically, they have the advantage of instantly 
putting to rest a plethora of problems regarding identity, physics, and consciousness.  For instance, 
without the ability to create or duplicate a conscious state, many conundrums simply disappear: 
teleportation by copying is not possible; consciousness cannot be simulated; self-location is easy; 
and Boltzmann Brains cannot just pop into existence. 
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